Attack Secured STM32G473VET6 Flash: LQFP100 512 KB Recovery
The STM32G473VET6 is the largest member of the G473 side of the family, packing 512 KB of dual-bank flash into the 100-lead LQFP100 body with a Cortex-M4 and FPU at 170 MHz. At this density the part is chosen for feature-rich control firmware where the extra space holds a full protocol stack, a file system or a generous boot stage. When that image is sealed and the board is the only copy, the work is to attack secured STM32G473VET6 flash and bring the contents out intact. The catch on this part is that protection is not a single wall.
The top G473 density
At 512 KB the STM32G473VET6 holds twice the image of the 256 KB part and four times the 128 KB entry, all in the same 100-lead footprint with FSMC and Quad-SPI available. The dual-bank flash with ECC lets the part keep a known-good image while it swaps to an update, which is exactly the pattern mature products use. That also means a recovery has to understand which bank was active, because copying the wrong one yields a stale or incomplete build. The size makes the read longer but not harder once access is restored.
A hidden region inside the array
Beyond the main array, the STM32G4 provides a securable memory area, which is a slice of flash that can be hidden from ordinary reads even when the part is not at the top protection level. On the STM32G473VET6 that slice can hold a boot locator or a small validation routine that the rest of the firmware trusts. A level 1 read that only walks the visible array will miss it, leaving the recovered image unable to start. The securable area is configured through the option bytes, so capturing those is part of seeing the whole part.
Why level 1 still hides data
Readout-protection level 1 blocks the debug port and the system bootloader from the main flash, and the securable area adds a second gate on top of that. The ROM bootloader honours both, so there is no software path that quietly returns the hidden slice. This is why a field unit at level 1 can still feel impenetrable to ordinary tools, because the protection is layered rather than single. The answer is not a stronger programmer but a different physical route to the silicon.
Ranking the attack surfaces
Against a secured STM32G473VET6 the practical surfaces rank by effort and by what they preserve. The table orders them from lowest to highest commitment, because the cheapest route that still keeps the image is the one worth trying first.
| Surface | Preserves image | Effort | When used |
|---|---|---|---|
| SWD at level 0 | n/a | none | open parts only |
| Bootloader read | n/a | low | open parts only |
| Optical fault after decap | yes | medium | level 1, live die |
| Power or clock glitch | yes | medium | level 1 timing window |
| Microprobing | yes | high | level 2, direct bus |
The fault-injection path
For most level 1 units the fastest clean route is an optical fault injected while the part boots. Decapsulation exposes the die of the STM32G473VET6 and keeps it electrically live, and a precisely timed light pulse against the security check makes the verification fall through for the instants needed to open the debug port. To attack secured STM32G473VET6 flash the fault must land on the security check, not on user code, or the part simply misbehaves. Power and clock glitching are a parallel surface, and our notes on power glitches and clock glitch attacks describe the technique. Either way the aim is to read, never to erase.
Reading the 512 KB out
With the port open the 512 KB dual-bank array streams out bank by bank, and the option bytes including the securable-area setting come with it. The read is taken twice and the passes are checksummed so a port that closed mid-capture is caught and re-read. On the G4 the ECC is read alongside the data, which lets a marginal bit be corrected rather than silently copied wrong. The result is a single image that contains the visible array and the hidden slice alike. A flash recovery pass then confirms the file is whole before analysis begins.
What you get back
You receive the complete flash binary image of the STM32G473VET6 including the securable region, the option bytes showing the original lock and hidden-area state, and a verification report with the read checksums. Where the aim is a replacement, the same verified image seeds a firmware clone. The same bench handles the STM32G473VCT6 binary copy and the STM32G473VBT6 source rebuild.