PostHeaderIcon Attack Secured STM32F413ZGT6 Software: Two SRAM Blocks on Two Buses

When a team sets out to attack secured STM32F413ZGT6 software, the first obstacle is not the readout protection setting but the memory map itself. This 100 MHz Cortex-M4, rated at 125 DMIPS / 339 CoreMark, carries 320 KB of SRAM, yet that number describes two separate blocks on two bus domains. A capture that treats the whole 320 KB as one linear buffer mislabels much of the runtime state, because the upper block answers to a different master port. The concrete problem is reconstructing a live program’s variables, stack and DMA buffers from a cold snapshot when the two regions do not share a single arbitration path.

Why the 320 KB headline hides two bus domains

ST quotes 320 KB of SRAM, but the figure is SRAM1 at 256 KB plus SRAM2 at 64 KB. SRAM1 hangs off the system AHB matrix shared with the DMA controllers of this 144-pin LQFP (Z/T) part. SRAM2 sits on the CPU instruction and data buses with short, predictable latency. Both stay contiguous from the standard STM32F4 SRAM base, so a flat read looks plausible.

Across the 256 KB boundary the effective master changes, and nothing in the address range advertises the switch. A single-base dump returns correct bytes yet cannot say which bus produced a variable or DMA descriptor. Compare how byte addressing shapes an Intel HEX dump of the 1 MB array, which hides a similar boundary.

Batch Acquisition Mode keeps DMA writing while the core sleeps

Batch Acquisition Mode lets the CPU sleep while peripherals keep sampling and DMA moves results into SRAM. With 10 UART, 3 CAN, SAI, 2 DAC, 2 DFSDM, a 100 MHz Quad-SPI and FMC on chip, many DMA masters can write during the window an engineer wants to freeze. A snapshot there is not a frozen image but a race between the readout and a live transfer.

That is why the partition matters for software recovery. If DMA targets SRAM1 while hot core variables live in SRAM2, a flat capture mixes fresh data with stale state. Engineers who probe the BGA back-side power grid face the same question from the supply side: knowing where activity lands is half the job.

To attack secured STM32F413ZGT6 software, map the bus domains first

A sound capture names every region before reading a byte. The worksheet below keeps the two SRAM blocks, the boundary decode and the separate Flash domain from collapsing into one range.

Region Capacity Bus attachment What a flat capture gets wrong
SRAM1 256 KB System AHB matrix, DMA reachable DMA may overwrite bytes during the read
SRAM2 64 KB CPU I-bus and D-bus Treated as matrix RAM, wrong latency model
Decode boundary At the 256 KB offset Bus-matrix decode, not memory Single-base assumption mislabels the upper block
Flash array (G) 1 MB Code bus, read under RDP Confused with SRAM when dumping the whole map

Cold-boot readout is where the two partitions diverge

After a fault or reset that leaves SRAM intact, the engineer reads it back through a debug path that may itself be constrained. Readout protection governs the Flash, not SRAM, so SRAM bytes are often reachable even when the 1 MB (G) image is not. Reachable does not mean interpretable: the base for SRAM1 and the offset for SRAM2 must be judged separately, or a stack pointer is decoded into the wrong block.

To attack STM32F413ZGT6 MCU readout protection you still must decide which SRAM domain a recovered pointer belongs to. How a locked ARM MCU behaves under protection is background, but the partition decision belongs to this 320 KB split alone.

Failure modes and the verification workflow

Three mistakes dominate. Reading past the 256 KB boundary with one base produces a convincing but misattributed image. Letting BAM DMA run during the sample yields a torn snapshot. Borrowing a sector table from another capacity grade, a confusion explored in single-bank versus dual-bank sector parsing, mislabels sectors too. Each stays silent until someone executes the recovered binary.

Verification is therefore per region. Checksum SRAM1 and SRAM2 independently, compare the Flash vector table separately, then re-run with DMA gated and confirm the digests agree. Only then does it make sense to recover STM32F413ZGT6 flash memory and join it to the runtime data; the read-side discipline is described in locked ARM MCU flash memory recovery. Anyone who tries to attack STM32F413ZGT6 software without this classification is guessing, and the standard an attack secured STM32F413ZGT6 extraction service must meet is a digest that matches on both buses.

Anyone who needs to attack secured STM32F413ZGT6 software should treat the 320 KB as two bus-attached regions, gate the DMA before sampling, and verify each block against its own checksum. The Flash is a readout problem, the SRAM a partitioning problem, and conflating them yields a plausible but wrong firmware image. If a frozen, bus-aware capture is required, our lab can run that workflow on the submitted device.

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