PostHeaderIcon Duplicate Protected NRF52833-QIAA-R Heximal: aQFN73 512 KB Copy

The NRF52833-QIAA-R is the largest package Nordic offers for this silicon, a 7 x 7 mm aQFN73 that breaks out 42 GPIO around a 512 KB flash and 128 KB RAM core running an Arm Cortex-M4 with FPU at 64 MHz. It is also the friendliest physical target in the family, because the die is small relative to the compound around it. When the goal is a working replacement rather than an analysis, the job is to duplicate protected NRF52833-QIAA-R heximal and reproduce everything that makes the original behave as it does.

A body that gives the etch room

The aQFN73 outline is large compared with the silicon inside it, so the mould compound has to be removed from a generous margin rather than from a tight edge. That margin is what makes the physical route practical on this part. The etch proceeds layer by layer under the microscope while the board keeps running, because a live part is worth more than a dead one when the target has to be duplicated. The exposed thermal pad and perimeter pads appear as the compound recedes, and the read then moves onto the die itself, addressing the array directly. Our notes on package decapsulation cover the sequence, and the dual probe and flying probe work applies once the pads are bare.

Reading the array on the exposed die

With the silicon visible and the part still alive, the 512 KB array can be read directly, which sidesteps the access port lock because the protection state never enters into it. The read is taken twice and the passes compared, which catches a cell that decodes differently between passes and confirms the image is clean. The result is a complete 512 KB hex image, checked for integrity before any duplication work begins.

What a wireless copy actually has to carry

A generic SoC copy is just bytes, and a radio SoC is not. To duplicate protected NRF52833-QIAA-R heximal faithfully, three things have to travel with the application code. The first is the radio configuration, since the transmit path is set from -20 dBm to +8 dBm in 4 dB steps and the receive path depends on the on-chip balun and the single-ended RF output being configured as it was. A duplicate that boots with default radio settings can pair and transmit badly even though every byte of application flash matches. The second is the User Information Configuration Registers, and the UICR is a mixed bag rather than a uniform block. It carries the customer data area, the PSELRESET pin-reset configuration and the NFC pin configuration, and while some of it is re-writable, some of it is one-time programmable, which means the state has to be captured accurately rather than reconstructed approximately. It is also where APPROTECT sits, so the protection state recorded in the copy has to match the original.

The third element: matching the protection state

Whether the NRF52833-QIAA-R is locked, and how it is locked, changes what a duplicate can boot into. Nordic does not use the STM32-style three-level readout protection, so the relevant state is the APPROTECT value in the UICR alongside the flash access control list, the secure boot readiness and the debug control and configuration blocks. When the original was locked, the copy has to carry that same state, otherwise a customer expecting a protected part receives one that opens to a debugger on the bench.

There is also a firmware half to the lock that is easy to miss. APPROTECT.FORCEPROTECT is expected to be written at startup, and if that step was skipped the device can look locked without being fully protected. On revisions with the improved two-step behaviour, among them nRF52833 revision 2 under build codes Bx0, a precisely timed voltage glitch on the supply during boot can slip past the check without triggering the erase, and both FORCEPROTECT and APPROTECT.DISABLE are reset by a pin reset, a brownout, a watchdog or a wake from System OFF. Our supply glitch notes cover the timing discipline for that work.

Checking the duplicate before it ships

The copy is compared field by field against the source rather than trusted because the write succeeded.

Check What is compared Why it matters
Application flash 512 KB, byte for byte The functional firmware
UICR customer area Every writable and OTP byte Keys, calibration, product data
PSELRESET and NFC pin setup Pin configuration bytes The correct pin comes up
Radio configuration Transmit and receive setup The radio behaves as before
Protection state APPROTECT and ACL settings The duplicate is no less secure

What you get back

You receive the duplicated NRF52833-QIAA-R hex image as a 512 KB binary with the UICR region separated out, a disassembly-based source reconstruction of application code, and a verification report listing every comparison above. The same bench also handles the QIAA-R7 encrypted memory read and the QDAA-R flash attack, and the same bench technique applies to the STM32G030C6T6 firmware on other silicon.

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